Premature deindustrialization phenomenon indicated by decreasing manufacturing industry share on the economy faster than expected. Its reflected on the national investment target achievement in the manufacturing sector. This study aims to analiyze the agency problem in investment decision of manufacturing industry in Indonesia by considering foreign ownership. The panel data method used with an annual period from 2007 to 2016 and 100 samples of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). This study shows that agency problems occur in indonesian manufacturing companies. Foreign ownership indirectly affects the investment of manufacturing companies reflect better control on management decision.
Investment decisions are important decisions for the company because they will affect the company value (Andreou 2017 ; Vranakis and Chatzoglou 2012) . Research about investment decision in Indonesia becomes more unique and interesting because of the financial constraints that will affect firm investment decisions such as in the research of Prasetyantoko (2007) and Hidayat (2010) . Financial constraints occur in manufacturing companies in Indonesia due to the crisis. Manufacturing companies in Indonesia experience an insufficient liquidity to fund the current production costs (Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000; Mydans 1998 ). Investment has a close relationship with agency theory. Messier et al. (2006) stated that agency problem is created by asymmetric information between principal and agent; and the occurrence of a conflict of interest between principal and agent.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Investment decisions on fixed assets commonly known as capital budgeting, reflect investment plans for long-term assets. Capital budgeting include overall process of analyzing project and deciding which projects will be included in the capital budget (Brigham and Houston 2009 ).
The essence of agency theory is the design of the right contract to aligning the interests of principals and agents in the event of a conflict of interest (Scott 1997) . According to Eisenhard (1989) , agency theory is based on three assumptions:
1. Assumptions about human nature Self-interest, has limited rationality, and risk aversion.
Assumptions about organization
Conflict between members in the organization and the existence of Asymmetric Information (AI) between the principal and agent.
Assumptions about information.
Information is seen as a commodity that can be traded. Chen et al. (2013) examined whether government and foreign share ownership affect the efficiency of corporate investment. They used data from privatized companies in 64 countries. Government and institutional foreign ownership commonly associated with different levels of asymmetric information and agency problems. The study found strong evidence that government ownership undermines the sensitivity of investment opportunities, thereby increasing investment inefficiency. Otherwise, foreign ownership strengthens the sensitivity of investment opportunities, thereby increasing investment efficiency. In addition, Chen et al. (2013) found that the relationship between foreign ownership and investment efficiency is stronger when the government releases control and governance levels of government institutions are weaker. Limanli (2015) examines the determinants or factors that influence R & D investment decisions in Turkey. The research shows that sales, subsidies, share of foreign ownership, competition incentives, scale of enterprise, domestic and foreign trade shares are important factors that influence the possibility of investment in R & D. Limanli's (2015) study have resulted in inconsistencies in results on foreign ownership variables. In 2008 the results of the study showed that foreign ownership had a negative effect on investment. This happened to foreign owners who prefer to invest R & D in their home countries and transfer their innovations abroad. Foreign ownership variables have a positive effect on R & D investment. These results confirm according to the hypothesis that larger companies allow easier access to funding. Prastyantoko (2007) who studies foreign ownership and corporate investment shows that foreign ownership does not affect investment. Foreign ownership tends to delay long-term investment commitments during the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia. Ownership of foreign shares has a lower commitment to long-term investment (fixed assets) than domestic stock ownership, although spending on short-term investments (inventory) is higher than domestic shareholdings. The next finding is that compared to domestic stock ownership, foreign share ownership has fewer problems due to the financial crisis, although spending on fixed asset investment is lower than local share ownership. This study aims to analyze the agency problem in investment decision of manufacturing industry in Indonesia by considering foreign ownership. The D_own variable sees foreign share ownership if the company has 10% or more foreign shareholders. This refers to the provisions of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding direct investment enterprise, where foreign investors who have 10 percent (or more) share ownership in a company have the power and voting rights that can influence the company's decision.
RESEARCH METHOD
The analysis method used in this study is dynamic panel data regression method. The model in this study is a model modification that refers to previous research conducted by Jiang et al. (2015) , Chen (2013) , and Aivazian (2005).
The basic model of agency problems in investment decisions
Cash flow (CFit) and Tobin Q (TQit-1) variables are the control variables used in this study, which is a control variable that refers to the research of Jiang et al. (2015) , Chen (2013) , and Aivazian (2005) to see factors that influence investment decisions.
Model of the influence of agency problems in investment decisions by considering the foregn ownership
The regression model used refers to Chen's (2013) research. While in the second model there is a D_ownit variable that is interacted with Tobin Q and Leverage to see whether the share ownership rate (dummy) by foreign investors is greater than 10% strengthening the influence of investment opportunities (TQit-1) and corporate control (Levit-1) on investment decisions (Iit).
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

Overview of inter-variable relations
Scatter plot of the relationships between variables carried out before analyzing the investment decisions of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, to see the relationship between explanatory variables used with investment variables. The analysis was carried out using the Mini Tab software. The plot of the relationship between explanatory variables on investment using the linear trend will then be proven by analyzing the dynamic panel data in the subsequent analysis. Figure 1 presents a pattern of relationships between explanatory variables with investment variables divided into four quadrants in each variable combination. Quadrants one and three show negative relation patterns between variables while quadrants two and four show positive relation patterns. Data distribution on the relationship between cash flow and investment in a sample of companies shows a positive trend in the relationship patterns. Then the distribution data on the relationship pattern between Tobin q and investment in the sample examined is in quadrants one and three so that it shows a positive trend. The distribution data on the relationship pattern between sales with the majority investment is in quadrants one and three which show a positive trend. While the pattern of the relationship between leverage and investment has the majority of data distribution in quadrants 2 and 4 which show a negative trend. ADMG UNIC  BIMA ARGO  SSTM  AMFG  MLIA  KBLM PTSN  DLTA  KBLI  KIAS  TIRT  SULI  DPNS  PIC O  ESTI  JKSW BTON TRST  INKP TKIM  KIC I  SRSN  A KPI MRA T  SPMA PYFA  INDS  MYTX SKLT  ULTJ  IGA R  ALMI  FA SW  INDR SQBB  SCC O  RIC Y INA F  LMPI TBMS JEC C  TOTO TPIA  INTP  SMCB  KDSI GJTL  BUDI  INDF  A PLI  A DES  MERK  GGRM  VOKS  TFCO  KA EF  C EKA  C TBN  TC ID  PRAS HMSP  MLBI  PSDN  NIPS BRAM MA SA BA TA  BRNA  ARNA  DVLA  TSPC  INC I  MYOR  JPFA  KLBF  SMSM  INA I  RMBASTTP  LION  MAIN  SMGR  AISA  IMA S  C PIN  PBRX   A SII  HDTX 
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Figure 1 Inter-Variable Relations Plot
Agency Problems Affect the Investment Decisions in Manufacturing Company
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the agency relationship in agency theory that a company is a nexus of contract between owners of economic resources (principal) and managers (agents) who take care of the use and control of these resources. The model estimation results in Table 2 show that the investment variable it-1 has a positive and significant impact on the investment of manufacturing companies, assuming ceteris paribus. Demarzo et al (2012) added that the emergence of agency problems will limit the company's investment, so there needs to be an optimal contract between investors and corporate agents in order to minimize the costs of agency problems. CFit has a positive and significant impact on investment in manufacturing companies. This shows that the greater in the cash flow shows the higher liquidity in the company will have an impact on increasing the company's investment, assuming ceteris paribus. Company with a higher cash flow will increase the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, where managers tend to use the cash for investment rather than distributing it in the form of dividends to shareholders. These results are related with the research of Chen et al (2015) and Jiang et al (2015) , where companies that have high cash flow have a high impact on their investment.
TQit-1 has a positive and significant impact on the investment of a manufacturing company. This shows that the higher investment opportunities will have an impact on increasing investment in manufacturing companies, assuming ceteris paribus. Martin (1996) explains that investment opportunities will increase the use of financing from corporate shares, where equity financing shows the potential for lower constraints on managers, thus giving them increased flexibility in current investments and future financing plans.
Salesit-1 becomes a proxy for market demand which has a positive and significant impact on the investment of manufacturing companies. If market demand increases, the company will get more revenue which later be used as an additional investment, then the investment in manufacturing companies will increase, ceteris paribus. Fuss and Vermeulen (2004) added to the results of research conducted, where sales growth was significant at 1 percent level. This shows that companies change their investment decisions in response to grow their demand. Fuss and Vermeulen (2004) added that new information about the company's fundamentals (sales growth) is used as a signal to invest (incentive for investment), so that the company's investment will increase Asian Journal of Applied Sciences (ISSN: 2321 -0893) Volume 06 -Issue 06, December 2018 Note : Symbols *, **, *** show significance at 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level
Levit-1 has a negative and significant impact on investment in manufacturing companies. The higher control of management will reduce investment because management will make investments that are believed to provide positive Net Present Value (NPV), assuming ceteris paribus. Related with Anwar and Sun (2014), Aivazian et al. (2005) who examined that leverage is negatively related to investment and that this negative effect is significantly stronger for companies with low growth opportunities compared to high growth opportunities. Table 3 summarize the estimation result of the dynamic panel model for quantitative verification of the problem of the influence of foreign ownership on investment in manufacturing companies in Indonesia. The estimation results in Table 3 (specification 1) show that the D_ownit variable does not have a significant effect on the investment of the manufacturing company. Ownership of foreign shares does not directly affect investment decisions. capital market will increase as the asymmetric information increases (Myer and Majluf 1948). Foreign ownership will improve good governance and reduce asymmetric information in the company (Stein 2003) .
Agency Problem Affect the Investment Decision in Manufacturing Company by Considering Foreign Ownership
Table 3 The estimation results of the impact of agency problems in investment decisions by considering the ownership of shares by foreign investors
Tobin Q has a positive impact on investment with the results of the D_ownit and TQit-1 interaction dummy, it can be seen that foreign ownership affecting managerial control will weaken Tobin's Q impact. The weakening of Tobin's Q impact proves that companies with foreign ownership will prioritize funding other, except equity financing from the capital market in Indonesia, such as using funding from its parent companies abroad rather than seeking equity funding from the domestic capital market. Managers will be more selective in choosing investments, especially in positive NPVs to prevent overinvestment.
The estimation results in Table 3 (specification 2), where D_ownit * Levit-1 variable shows a negative and significant impact, that means control over management will be more effective, where foreign ownership will increase the impact of corporate control in order to push the investment. This is related with the previous literature by Csermely and Vincze (2000) where foreign ownership in an industry provides a positive signal in better knowledge. The previous literature by Khanna and Palepu (1999) show that control over company management is better so that investment becomes lower in companies with foreign ownership.
The results comparation between previous subchapter related to leverage that negatively affect investment with the results of the D_ownit and Levit-1 (interaction dummy), it can be seen that foreign ownership affect the managerial control will strengthen leverage. Foreign ownership shares in a company will strengthen the sensitivity of leverage or external funding through debt as a proxy for control over management of investment in manufacturing companies in Indonesia. These results indicate that companies with foreign ownership will be more careful, especially when companies are investing using external financing.
CONCLUSION
The agency problems occur in manufacturing companies in Indonesia. Agency problems will not affect the control pattern in managers but tend to affect investment opportunities and availability of funds in the company. Foreign ownership as a proxy for Good corporate governance does not directly affect investment decisions in manufacturing companies in Indonesia. However, foreign ownership can weaken the influence of capital market funding and strengthen the influence of debt financing which shows increased control over management.
